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ABSTRACT 
An extension of the resolution principle was recently proposed by Dubois and 
Prade for logical clauses weighted by certainty degrees and was used in theorem 
proving under uncertainty. These certainty degrees were lower bounds on necessity 
measures. In the case considered here, the available information may also be an 
upper bound on a necessity measure, or, if one prefers, a lower bound on the dual 
possibility measure. It leads to a second resolution principle for clauses weighted in
terms of possibility or necessity degrees. The formal analogy between these two 
resolution principles and the ones existing in modal logic is stressed. Finally, the case 
where the uncertain clauses include fuzzy predicates, to which the excluded-middle 
law no longer applies, is studied, and a suitable adaptation of the extended 
resolution principles is proposed. 
KEYWORDS: uncertainty, possibility measure, necessity measure, fuzzy 
predicate, resolution principle 
1. BACKGROUND 
Possibility theory offers a framework for modeling uncertainty that enables us 
to distinguish between the total lack of certainty in favor of the truth of a 
proposition and the certainty that the proposition is false. Namely, to each 
proposition p are attached two numbers, denoted by I I (p) and N(p)  and 
interpreted, respectively, as the degree of possibility and the degree of necessity 
thatp is true. The possibility and necessity measures II and Ntake their values in 
the real interval [0, 1] and satisfy the characteristic axioms 
II(p v q)= max[1-I(p), l-I(q)] (1) 
N(p  ^ q)= min[N(p), N(q)] (2) 
Address correspondence to Didier Dubois, Laboratoire Langages et Systbmes lnformatiques, 
Universitd Paul Sabatier, 118 route de Narbonne, 31062 Toulouse Cddex, France. 
International Journal of ApproMmatc Reasoning 1990; 4:1-21 
Q 1990 Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 
655 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10010 0888-613X/90/$3.50 
2 Didier Dubois and Henri Prade 
and the relationship 
N(p)  = 1 - 1-I("~ p)  (3) 
which is in agreement with the dual character of axioms (1) and (2) and 
expresses that a proposition p is all the more necessarily true as the opposite 
proposition (~p)  is not possibly true. 
The postulate 
I I (p v -~p)= 1 (4) 
[or equivalently N(p  A -~p) = 0], which is natural if the excluded-middle law 
holds, leads, together with (1) and (3), to the fact that for any Boolean 
proposition p we have 
N(p)  = 0 or II(p) = 1 (5) 
When N(p)  = 0 = 
When N(p)  = 0; 
When N(p)  = 0; 
When N(p)  = a< 1; 
When N(p)= 1 = 
H(p), the proposition p is considered to be false. 
H(p) = a < 1, the possibility that p is false is greater than 
the possibility that p is true. 
H(p)= 1, "p true" and "p  false" are equally possible. 
H(p) = 1, the possibility thatp is true is greater than the 
possibility that p is false. 
1-l(p), the proposition p is considered to be true [~p is 
completely impossible, i.e., I-I(-~p) = 0]. 
In other words, p is all the more certainly true as N(p)  is closer to 1. In 
addition, note that requirements (1)-(4) entail only the inequalities 
I I(p A q)_<min[II(p), II(q)] and N(p  V q )>max[N(p) ,  N(q)] (6) 
and nothing more (the equalities do not hold in general). In particular we may 
have both H(p) > 0 and H(~p)  > 0, while it is natural to postulate that I I(p A 
~p)  = 0 [or equivalently N(p  V ~p)  = 1] with Boolean propositions. 
Possibility measures satisfying the characteristic axiom (1) were introduced by 
Zadeh [1]; for further details on possibility and necessity measures, the reader is 
referred to Dubois and Prade [2, 3]. 
We have already established [4] the following inference rule, which extends 
Robinson's resolution principle [5] to uncertain clauses, for Boolean proposi- 
tions p, q, r (which hence satisfy the excluded-middle and the contradiction 
laws) 
N(p  v q) >_ ot 
N(  ~p V 0>_/3 
N(q  V r)>- min(oL,/3) 
(7) 
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Pattern (7) expresses that if ot and/3 are lower bounds on the values of a necessity 
measure that grades the uncertainty of two parent clauses, the best lower bound 
that can be deduced for the value of the necessity measure attached to the 
resolvent is min(a, /3). When ct = /3 = 1, there is no uncertainty, and the 
standard resolution principle is recovered. This state of facts motivates the 
following definition. 
Dsnsrriorq 1 A rule of inference under uncertainty that provides the best 
lower (or upper) bound on the degree of  uncertainty of its conclusion 
from the knowledge of  bounds on the degrees of uncertainty of its 
premises is said to be optimal (provided that the bound is computed in 
agreement with the axiomatics of  the chosen uncertainty model). When 
the bounds on the degree of uncertainty of  the conclusion are weaker 
than the optimal bounds, the rule is said to be admissible (or valid). 
It can be proved that if a set of clauses is logically consistent in the usual 
sense, then any assignment of lower bounds on the values of a necessity measure 
for these clauses is permitted because it cannot violate axiom (2) (Dubois and 
Prade [4]). Moreover, noticing that 
¥c~, Ya, N(¥xP(x)) > ol ~ N(P(a)) >_ c~ (8) 
where P is an ordinary predicate, the resolution principle xtended to uncertain 
clauses can be applied to clauses with variables. The refutation method can be 
extended also: Adding the negation of the proposition to be proved (with a 
necessity weighting equal to 1) to the set of uncertain consistent clauses under 
consideration, any lower bound obtained for the empty clause derived by means 
of the resolution principle can be shown to be a lower bound of the necessity of 
the proposition to be proved (Dubois and Prade [4]). This extended refutation 
method has been implemented with a linear strategy for theorem-proving 
purposes, making use of an ordered search technique in order to obtain the 
empty clause with the greatest possible lower bound (Dubois et al. [6]). 
A resolution-like pattern of reasoning where the two parent clauses are 
respectively weighted by lower bounds of a necessity measure and of the dual 
possibility measure is now presented. 
2. ANOTHER RESOLUTION PRINCIPLE UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
Knowing that N(p)  >__ ot > 0 entails H(p)  = 1 and N('~p) = 0 due to (5) 
and (3). It is equivalent to know a nontrivial upper bound on the dual possibility 
measure, since then I I (~p)  <__ 1 - c~ < 1. Knowing a lower bound on a 
possibility degree is a much poorer piece of information; indeed, from H(p)  > 
/3 > 0, nothing can be said about N(p)  or l-I(~p). However, patterns of 
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reasoning taking into account lower bounds on possibility degrees may be of 
interest when only this information is available. 
Reasoning with Possibility-Qualified Knowledge 
First, let us observe that nothing can be deduced about I I (q V r) from I I (p  v 
q) _ ot and I I(-~p V r) _> /3. Indeed these two inequalities, owing to (1), 
translate into max[H(p),  II(q)] _ t~ and max[H(-~p), H(r)] >_/3; since max[H 
(p) ,  H(-~p)] = 1 [due to (4) and (1)], one of these inequalities i trivial. Let us 
suppose that I I (p )  = 1; then I I (q) may take any value, and since l-I(-~p) 
remains totally unknown we have no information on the value of I I(r). I f I I ( -~p)  
= 1 we reach a similar conclusion. Therefore, nothing can be said of the value 
of I I (q v r) = max[H(q), II(r)]. 
In the case of parent clauses with lower bounds of mixed nature we can prove 
the following proposition. 
PROPOSmON 1 the following inference rule is optimal for Boolean 
propositions. 
N(p V q)>ct 
I I ( -~p V r)>/3 (9) 
r l (qv  r )>[~ if or+/3_< 1 
- if ot+f l> 1 
Proof Wehave I I (~pA ~q)  _< 1 - c~. Besides, -~pVr = ( -~pA -~q) 
V (-~p A q) V r. Then I I ( -~p V r) _> /3 is equivalent to max[lI(-~p ^ -~q), I I  
((-~p A q) V r)] > /3, and finally we get max[1 - or, H(q V r)] > /3, since 
H(t) > II(s) as soon as s logically entails t. Hence H(q q r) > /3 provided 
that 1 - ot </3. Clearly, if or + 13 <_ 1, H((-~p A q) V r)as well as I I (q V r) 
may take any value. When a +/3 > 1, the assignment II(( -~p ^  q) v r) =/3 
is permitted, since it does not contradict the constraints I I(-~p V r) > /3 and 
I I(-~p ^  ~q)  _< 1 - c~ < /3; then I I (q V r) may take any value between/3 
and 1. Thus (9) gives the best possible lower bound for I I (q v r). Obviously 
no nontrivial lower bound can be found for N(q V r), since it would entail I I  
(q V r) = 1 due to (5), which would lead to a contradiction if/3 #: 1; if/3 = 
1, it can be checked that N(q V r) = 0 is still feasible. • 
We have established particular cases of (9) corresponding to the modus 
ponens and to the modus tollens in earlier works (Dubois and Prade [7, 8]). Note 
that the lower bounds c~ and B can be independently assigned in (9) provided that 
the propositions p v q and ~p v r are consistent. Since ~p A ~ q logically 
entails -~p v r, we have H(~p  ^  -~ q) _< H( '~p V r); then any upper bound on 
H(-~p A -~ q) can be assigned without any contradiction with the lower bound 
on H(-~p V r) as soon as -~p A -~ q and -~p V r are not logically equivalent 
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(which comes down to the consistency of {p v q, -',p v r}). 
The new inference rule leads us to introduce an operation [m on the unit 
interval, defined by 
¥(ot,/3) E [0,1] 2 o t lm/3=f0  i fa+/3<l  (10) 
if c~+/3> 1 
which expresses the resulting lower bound in (9). It is a nonsymmetrical 
conjunction. Indeed when c~ and/3 are restricted to {0, 1}, a [m/3  = 1 if and 
only if ot = /3 = 1, which corresponds to the truth table of the conjunction i  
binary logic. Moreover, as we have previously pointed out [9], the operation ]m 
can be defined from the symmetrical conjunction operation min(o~,/3). Indeed, 
we have 
o~ Im/3= 1-sup{t E [0, 1], min(ot, 0_<1-/3} 
=inf{t E [0, 1], max(l-or,  t)---B} (11) 
Translated interms of sets, (11) expresses [when (a,/3) are restricted to {0, 1 } 2] 
that he intersection A (3 B can be viewed as the smallest set T such that A ¢ tO T 
_~ B (where A c denotes the complement of A). 
The nonsymmetrical conjunction operation defined by (10) is also encoun- 
tered in the following noteworthy result: 
PRO~SmON 2 Any pair of dual possibility and necessity measures 
satisfies the inequality 
I I(p A q)>__N(p) Im H(q) (12) 
Proof: 
H(q) = fl((p ^  q) V (-~p ^  q))= max[H(p A q), H(-~p A q)] 
_<max[H(p A q), H(-~p)] =max[fl(p  ^ q), 1 -N(p) ]  
Clearly if H(q) > 1 - N(p)then H(p A q) = II(q); otherwise H(p A q) 
may take any value in agreement with the constraint H(p ^ q) _< H(q), 
which always holds. Hence we get (12). • 
Note that (12) translates into the inference rule 
N(p)>_c~ 
n(q)>_/3 
I I (pAq)  I> ~1 m/3 
since I m is a monotonically nondecreasing operation. There does not exist an 
analogous pattern changing N(p) into H(p), since we may have H(p) = 1 = 
H(q) and 11(p A q) = 0 simultaneously; in that case H(p ^  -1 q) = 1 = H(--,p 
A q). 
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To summarize, pattern (9) expresses that if the degree of necessity (or 
certainty) that p v q is true is sufficiently large with respect o the degree of 
possibility that ~p V r is true, then we can conclude that it is possible that q V r 
is true with a degree at least equal to this degree of possibility. 
In addition, a particularization rule, analogous to (8), holds for possibility 
measures. Namely, 
¥a, ¥a, (Fl(¥x P(x))>_ot ~ H(P(a))->o0 (13) 
Indeed interpreting "v"  in terms of conjunction in a finite setting, we have 
min FI (P(a i ) )>I I (P(aO A . "  A P(a,,))>ot 
i 
due to (6), which gives Vi, H(P(ai))  > or. More generally from H(Vx P(x) )  >- 
or we can infer II(Vy P( f (y ) ) )  >_ or, wheref is  a mapping. 
A Refutation Method 
Lastly, a refutation method can be associated with (9). Indeed if we are 
interested in proving that p is true, necessarily or possibly to some degree, we 
add in the knowledge base the assumption 
N(-~p) = I 
that is, that p is false (with total certainty). Let us decompose p into the 
disjunction p = p~ V • • • V Pm, where Pi is a conjunction of literals or a literal. 
Then, using (2), N(~p)  = 1 is equivalent to min[N(~pl) ,  " " ,  N(~pm)]  = 
1, in other words, 
N(~p l )= 1 
N(  -api ) = 1 
N(  "apm ) = I 
When Pi is a conjunction Pi = P i !  A • • • A Pin where pq is a literal, it leads to a 
clause whose necessity measure is equal to 1, namely 
N(-ap i  I V "'" V ~Pin)= 1 (A) 
Suppose that the use of (7) or (9) (possibly in an iterative way) on the set of 
clauses under consideration (other than the clauses produced by the refutation of 
p)  leads to 
I I(pik ) >-- otk (13) 
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and 
Yj ~: k, N(pq) > o~j (C) 
then again applying (7) iteratively to (A) and (C), and finally (9) to the result 
N('-'Pik) > minj,k o~j and to (B), we finally obtain [since rain(l, or) = a] 
Yl(~)>(min otj) Im ~k 
j *k  
where ~ denotes the empty clause. Observe that we must have at most one 
literal denoted by Pik here whose uncertainty is estimated under the form of a 
lower bound of a possibility measure if we want to reach the empty clause from 
(A), (B), and (C) with a strictly positive bound, since, as already pointed out, 
there does not exist a resolution-like pattern of reasoning working on a pair of 
clauses for which only lower bounds on possibility measures are known. 
Besides, there are many different ways of applying (7) and (9) to (A), (B), and 
(C) in order to reach the empty clause. They are all equivalent whatever the step 
where we apply (9) for the first time [we can no longer use (7) after], because of 
the following identity: 
V(o~,/5, 7) E [0, 1] 2, min(~,/5) Im -~=ot Im (/5 Im ":) (14) 
which can be easily checked as well as 1 I m ~ = or. Indeed this identity 
guarantees that 
(min aj) Im ~k=( min o~y) Im [Ottl Im "'" [0% Im ak) "" "] 
)-'#k j .k  
J~ll,... ,i r 
Clearly, using (2) and (12), from (B) and (C) we get 
II(pi)_>(min aj) Im ctk 
j-~k 
and finally this lower bound still applies to H(p) since II(p) >_ H(pi) due to 
(1). We observe that the lower bound of the possibility for the empty clause is 
indeed a lower bound of the possibility thatp is true. In case we get N(pik) >-- 
Otk [instead ofII(Pik) > C~k], (7) will give N(O) >- mini otj, and due to (2) and 
(6) we have indeed N(p)  >_ maxi N(pi)  >- mini aj; the lower bound of the 
necessity measure of the empty clause is also a lower bound of the necessity that 
p is true. Thus, the information obtained for the empty clause, that is a lower 
bound and the nature of the corresponding measure (possibility or necessity), 
also applies to the proposition to be proved (whose negation was added with total 
certainty to the knowledge base). 
Example. Let us consider the three uncertain clauses 
(i) P(x) v Q(x) (N, ~) 
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(ii) -'~ Q(a) (N,/3) 
(iii) -~ P(x) V R(x)  (1-[, 3') 
where a is a constant (the universal quantifier is omitted); the nature of the 
measure and the known lower bound are given within parentheses. For instance, 
(iii) means II(Vx --1P(x) V R (x)) > 7. If we want to prove that 3x R (x) is true 
(somewhat possibly or necessarily), we add the clause 
(iv) -~R(x) (N, 1) 
Then (7) and (8) on (i) and (ii) give 
(v) P(a) (N, rain(or,/3)) 
(9) and (12) on (iii) and (v) give 
(vi) R(a) (H, rain(a, 13) I tn 7) 
and (9) and (12) on (iv) and (vi) finally give 
(vii) Z (H, min(a,/3) [m 7) 
that is, IIOx R (x)) _> min(a,/3) ]m 7. However, the empty clause can be also 
obtained in other ways. For instance, (9) on (iii) and (iv) gives -~P(x) (H, 7), 
which together with (i), by (9), gives Q(x) (H, a Im 7), which in turn gives 
(l-I,/3 [m (o~ Im 7)) by unifying the previous result with (ii) using (9) and (12). 
Here due to (14) the same lower bound is always obtained. More generally, the 
empty clause may be reached with various lower bounds. A strategy should be 
designed to obtain the best (greatest) possible lower bound in terms of possibility 
for the empty clause if no nontrivial lower bound can be found [using (7) and (8)] 
in terms of necessity. This is a topic for further esearch. 
As recalled in Section 1, if a set of clauses is logically consistent, hen any 
assignment of lower bounds on the values of a necessity measure for these 
clauses is permitted because it cannot violate axiom (2). The converse is also 
obviously true (consider the particular assignment that attaches the lower bound 
1 to any clause). By constrast, a set of clauses where some of them are weighted 
in terms of lower bounds of a possibility measure may become inconsistent if we 
remove this weighting. For instance, 
II(p)_>o~ and H('-~p)_>/3 
is consistent with the axioms of possibility theory for any values of o~ and/3, 
while {p, -~p} is inconsistent. However, there does not exist any pattern of 
reasoning that would enable us to reach the empty clause in any manner from 
these two inequalities! 
3. ANALOGY WITH MODAL LOGIC 
In the modal system Q, Farifias del Cerro [10] has shown that the two 
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following rules of inference (which correspond to a modal resolution) are valid: 
[ ]E  
[ ]F  
[] 61(E, F) (15) 
[~E 
<)F 
0 61(E, F)  (16) 
where [] and 0 are, respectively, the "necessary" and "possible" modal 
operators, and 61(E, F )  is the resolvent of the generalized clauses E and F (E 
and F are disjunctions of literals, or of disjunctions preceded by the modal 
operator [5, or of a conjunction of clauses preceded by the modal operator 0). 
For completeness reasons, 06t (E, F )  can be replaced in (16) by the strongest 
conclusion 0(61(E, F )  ^ F);  see also Farifias del Cerro and Penttonen [11]. 
Note that in the proof of pattern (9) we have established the intermediary esult 
1-I((-~p A q) V r) >-- a[m/3,  where (- ,p  ^  q) V r is indeed equal to 61(p v q, 
-,p v r) A (- ,p V r); thus we also have the stronger pattern 
N(E)>oL 
FI(F)>/3 
[I(61(E, F) A F) Z ~ [m/3 
in our approach. It indicates that even if the inference rule (9) is optimal for 
conclusion q V r, it is not complete. 
There is a striking analogy between the patterns (7) and (15) on the one hand 
and (9) and (16) on the other hand when ot = /~ = 1 [i.e., when the clauses are 
considered as totally certain (necessary) orpossible]. This is not too surprising if
we consider that the basic axiom of possibility theory, namely (1) [or 
equivalently (2)] can be viewed as a numerical counterpart of one of the axioms 
of the modal system T (in von Wright's axiomatization; see Hughes and 
Cresswell [12]), which states the logical equivalence of 0p V 0q and 0(p  v q) 
[or equivalently of Rp A []q and [--l(p A q)]. However, the precise relation 
between modal ogic and possibility theory is not yet fully clarified. Especially 
from a semantic point of view, the idea of accessibility relations between 
possible worlds had no counterpart in possibility theory until recently. 
Preliminary results on this topic are in Dubois et al. [13]. 
In (15) or (16), E or F may contain modal operators. In our framework, we 
may also allow propositions involving statements about possibility or necessity 
measures in patterns (7) or (9). For instance, (7) enables us to infer from 
N('-,p V [H(q)>-od)>-/3 
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and 
that 
N(p)  >_ 3' 
N[H(q) _> t~] _> min(B, 30 
The problem is then to interpret such a conclusion and possibly to reduce 
expressions with nested possibility or necessity measures; for example, finding 
an operation .1. such that we have 
N[H(q)_ot]__5 = H(q)_ot _L 6 
This reduction is an open problem. However, an expression such as N[H(q) _> 
o~] _> ~ can in principle be interpreted in terms of possibility distributions on 
possibility distributions, ince a possibility measure or a necessity measure can 
always be viewed as built from a possibility distribution (Zadeh [1 ]; Dubois and 
Prade [2]). Namely, N[H(q) _> a] -> ~ can be understood in the following way 
using (3): Any possibility distribution that does not satisfy the constraint 1-I(q) 
_ ot is considered to be possible at most to the degree 1 - 6. However, the use 
of nested graded modalities in practical situations may turn out to be rather 
limited. 
4. DEALING WITH CLAUSES INVOLVING FUZZY PREDICATES 
A proposition with a vague or fuzzy predicate, called a fuzzy proposition for 
short--for example, "Peter is young"--no longer satisfies either the excluded- 
middle law or the contradiction law. Then patterns (7) or (9) need to be adapted 
to handle such propositions. First we have to specify what it means to attach a 
degree of uncertainty o a vague proposition. 
Because algebras of fuzzy propositions are no longer Boolean, standard 
theorem-proving methods based on refutation o longer apply in spite of a 
resolution procedure discovered by Lee [14]. Presently existing reasoning 
techniques in fuzzy logic (Zadeh [15]) are based on meaning computation. In
order to derive syntactic methods for fuzzy reasoning an idea can be to express a
fuzzy proposition under the form of a weighted family of standard propositions, 
the weights expressing uncertainty as in Sections 1 and 2. Using the results of 
those sections, we propose formal manipulation rules for uncertain fuzzy 
propositions that remain in agreement with possibility theory and partially 
obviate the need for an explicit handling of membership functions and for 
nonlinear optimization. 
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Meaning of an Uncertain Vague Proposition 
We postulate the equivalence between the assertion P(x)  stating that an object 
certainly satisfies the fuzzy predicate P and the specification of a fuzzy set 
(Zadeh [16]) also denoted by P and defined by its membership function/~p from 
the referential Uto [0, 1]. The fuzzy set P can also be viewed as the family of its 
strong h-cuts Px, which are ordinary sets defined by 
VX, O_<X< 1, Px= {u E U, #p(u)>X} (17) 
Indeed we have 
#p(u)=sup{X E [0, 1), u E Px} (18) 
It is supposed hereafter that P is a normalized fuzzy set, that is, vh < 1, Px :~ 
~.  Note that the Px's are nested: that is to say, 
h>X'  = P× c_ Px, (19) 
In (19), Px is said to be more specific than Px, .  Strong h-cuts of fuzzy sets 
enjoy the following property with respect to the union operation P U Q defined 
by #Puo = max(#p, #O) 
VX<l , (PU  Q)x=Px U Q× 
To a membership function #p is associated a possibility measure II, from 2 v 
into [0, 1], in a natural way (Zadeh [1], Dubois and Prade [2]), by 
¥Q _c U, II(Q)= sup/zp(u) (20) 
uEQ 
Viewing Q as the extension of a (nonfuzzy) predicate (we shall denote a 
predicate and its extension by the same symbol), saying that x satisfies Q means 
that x satisfies one of the elementary predicates corresponding tothe singletons 
{ u } whose union forms the extension of Q. Then (20) estimates the extent o 
which there exists an element u in the extension of Q that is compatible with the 
fuzzy predicate P. Note that (20) yields 
II((P×) c) = sup #p(u) <- h (21) 
ucp x 
where (Px) c denotes the complement ofPx. (21) expresses that he compatibility 
with P of an element of U taken outside the extension of Px cannot be greater 
than h. 
Equation (21) suggests he equivalence between the assertion that "x  certainly 
satisfies the fuzzy predicate P"  and saying that ¥h we are certain to the degree 
1 - X that P×(x) is true. 
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DEFnvmoN 2 The fuzzy statement P(x) (N, 1) is equivalent to the set of 
inequalities 
v)`< 1, N(Px(x))>_ 1- )` (22) 
This equivalence can be easily understood from (21) noticing thatN(Px(x)) >_ 1 
- )` ¢* I-I(-', [P×(x)]) _< )` due to (3). Roughly speaking, Definition 2 expresses 
that when we are certain that x satisfies the fuzzy predicate P, we are completely 
certain that x satisfies the ordinary predicate P0 and less and less certain that x 
satisfies more specific predicates Px when )` increases. Note that (22) becomes 
trivial when applied to an ordinary predicate, because then all the strong )`-cuts 
are identical. P is viewed as a collection of nested confidence sets. 
Expression (22) can also be justified in terms of the principle of minimum 
specificity (Dubois and Prade [17]). Indeed i fA  is an ordinary subset of U, the 
statement N(A)  >_ ~ specifies a set of membership functions/z such that 
N(A) = inf [1 - # (u)] _> c~ (23) 
uEA 
holds. Any such # is a candidate for representing the meaning of the statement 
"A  (x) is certain with degree at least ~. "  The principle of minimum specificity 
states that the least arbitrary choice among the solutions of (23) is the least 
specific solution #*, that is, such that #* _ # for any # satisfying (23). It is easy 
to verify that 
1 i fuEA 
#*(u)= 1 -a  i fu  CA 
= max[#A(u), 1 - ct] (24) 
As a consequence, N(P×(x)) _> 1 - )` can be translated by the possibility 
distribution #~' = max(),,/zpx). 
PROeOSmON 3 The greatest solution to the set of simultaneous con- 
straints (22) for all )` E [0, 1) is Iz* = #p. 
Proof." 
#*(u) = inf max[X, #~(u)]  
), 
= inf{ h lu ¢ Px } = #.(u) (25) 
The latter equality, which contrasts with (18), holds because on the one hand 
V)` < #.(u), u E Px, and on the other hand Ve > 0, )` = /ze(u) + e = u 
Px. • 
Hence the membership function t~p can be reconstructed from the set of 
inequalities N(Px(x)) -> 1 - )`, ¥)`, and the principle of minimum specificity. 
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These inequalities can thus be interpreted as holding P(x) for certain. The 
interest of Definition 2 is to formally express a vague assertion in terms of a 
family of uncertain classical propositions. 
The assertion "x  satisfies P with certainty c~," where P is a fuzzy predicate, 
can now be interpreted in the following way, where Px is short for P×(x): 
VX_> 1-c~, N(px)_> I -X  and v) ,< 1-c~, N(px)_>c~ 
This means that we are certain at least to the degree a that P×(x) is true for the 
less specific representatives of P and less and less certain for more specific 
representatives when )~ increases from 1 - ot to 1. This can be synthesized 
under the following form. 
DEFINITION 3 The necessity-qualified fuzzy assertion P(x) (N, a) is 
equivalent to the set of inequalities 
VX< 1, N(P×(x))>_min(a, 1 - )0 (26) 
When ct = 1, (26) reduces to (22). Definition 3 is in the spirit of the modeling of 
fuzzy default values proposed by Prade [18], where a statement like "It is 
certain at the degree ct that Peter is young" is understood in the following way: 
Any age value is all the more possible for Peter as it belongs to the fuzzy set 
modeling 'young' with a higher degree, but any value is at least possible at the 
degree 1 - a, since we are not completely certain that Peter is young. 
Using the principle of minimum specificity for all )~ in (26) leads to defining a 
possibility distribution induced by the statement "x  satisifies P with certainty 
ct," as follows. 
PROPOSITION 4 The greatest solution to the set of simultaneous inequali- 
ties (26)for all )~ E [0, 1) is Ix* = max(#p, 1 - ~). 
Proof 
#*(u) = inf max[ttpx(U), 1- rain(a, 1 - X)] due to (24), (25) 
=inf {max(1-ot, X)Iu ¢ P×} 
X 
=max( I -a ,  inf{Xlu ¢ Px}) 
= max[gp(U), 1 - or] • 
That is exactly the proposal made by Prade [18] for modeling necessity- 
qualified fuzzy statements in the form of a fuzzy default value. Recomputing 
N(Px) = 1 - II((Px) c) on the basis of g* leads, due to (20), to 
N(P×) = inf min[ct, 1 - up(u)] < min(t~, 1 - X) 
uq_P)~ 
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This remark completely justifies the equivalence between Definition 3 and a 
fuzzy default value. 
The L ink  with Zadeh 's  Def in i t ion  o f  the Poss ib i l i ty  o f  a Fuzzy  Event  
Let p and p '  be two fuzzy propositions of the form P(x) and P ' (x ) ,  
respectively, where P and P '  are defined on the same referential U. Then the 
symmetrical quantity defined by Zadeh [1], 
H(p, p ' )  = sup #pn p, (u) = sup min [ #p(u), #p, (u)] (27) 
uqU u~U 
estimates the extent o which it is possible to find a value that is somewhat 
compatible with both P and P',  or in other words the extent o which the 
intersection P N P'  is not empty. It is a measure of consistency between p and 
p '  called the possibility of  the fuzzy event P, given #e, . Clearly P and P '  can 
be exchanged. But, letting P '  be a classical set Q, (27) reduces to (20). 
Dually, the dissymmetrical quantity N(p,  p ' )  defined as 1 - H(-~p, p ' )  is 
the necessity of  the fuzzy event P, given #p, (Dubois and Prade [2]). Here - ,p 
is associated to the membership function 1 - #p, following Zadeh. Clearly, 
H(p, ~p)  _< 0.5. 
PROPOSmON 5 Let#*= max(#p, 1 - ~). Then using the definition of the 
necessity N(P)  of  the fuzzy event P given #* we get N(P)  >_ min(a, 0.5). 
Proof 
N(P) = inf max [#p(u) ,  1 - #* (u)] 
u 
= inf max { 1 - max[#e(u) ,  1 - or], #p(u)} 
u 
= min { i nf max [1--#p (u), #p (u)], inf max [or, #p (u)] } 
u u 
~>min[a, 1-I- I(p, -~p)]_>min(a, 0.5) • 
That is, we do not recover N(p)  >_ ~ for c~ > 0.5 generally. This is because the 
degree of necessity of a fuzzy proposition p given this proposition p itself is only 
known to be greater than 0.5, due to the lack of contradiction law in fuzzy logic. 
But, from a semantic point of view, when an individual asserts that a fuzzy 
proposition P(x) is held for certain, it is more natural to translate it into the 
membership function #p, rather than stating N(P)  >_ 0.5. Moreover, stating 
N(P)  = 1 is no good either, since N(p,  p) = 1 and only i fp  is not fuzzy. 
These facts make it difficult, if not impossible, to model the fuzzy statement "x  
satisfies P with certainty at least or" by the inequality N(P)  >_ ct. Hence the 
mathematical definition of the necessity of a fuzzy event appears to be poorly 
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adapted to the representation f necessity-qualified fuzzy propositions, while 
(22) and (26) sound more satisfactory in this respect. 
Resolution Principle with Necessity-Qualified Fuzzy Propositions 
We are now in a position to extend pattern (7) to the case of fuzzy 
propositions. First, the measure of consistency I I(p, p') defines a threshold 
such that 
vX~II(p, p'), Px ^  Px = ~ (28) 
where ~ denotes the contradiction, or, if we prefer, N(~px V -~p~ ) = 1. In 
particular, i fp '  = ~p where the negation is defined in the usual way by/zp, = 
1 - #p, recall that H(p,  p ' )  _< 0.5. 
Let us now consider the two uncertain and fuzzy premises 
p V q (N, c0 
p '  v r (N , /3 )  
which can be interpreted using Definition 3 and (p v q)× = Px v q×. Then 
applying (7) twice to the three uncertain clauses obtained for h >_ H(p,  p'), that 
is, 
N(~px V ~px)= 1 
N(px V qx)>_min(ct, 1 -X)  
N(Px V rx)>_min(~, l -X )  
gives 
Vk_>l-I(p, p'), N(q× V r~)>_min(a, /3, 1 -k )  
Let us observe that 
VX_<H(p, p'), N(qx V rx)>_min(ct, ~, 1 -H(p ,  p ' ) ]  
since the inequality holds for ~, = H(p, p ' )  and is true also for smaller values of 
h due to the nestedness of the strong X-cuts [i.e., (19)]. Then we can summarize 
the last two results under the form 
V),, N(q× V rx)_>min[a,/3, 1 -H(p ,  p ' ) ,  l - k ]  
Finally, since q× V rx = (q V r)× using Proposition 4, we conclude that we have 
q v r (N, min(a,/3, 1 -H(p ,  p')])  
We have thus established the following proposition. 
PROPOSmON 6 The inference rule involving necessity-qualified uzzy 
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propositions 
p V q (N, ~) 
p '  V r (N,/3) 
(29) 
q v r (N, min[c~, fl, 1 -l-I(p, p')]) 
is valid (with respect o the interpretation given by Definition 3). 
Whenp andp'  are ordinary propositions, l-I(p, p ' )  E {0, 1}, and fo rp '  -- 
-~p we have FI(p, p ' )  = 0 [from (27)] and we recover (7). Pattern (29) is 
intuitively satisfying since it expresses that we are as certain that q v r is true as 
we are certain that at the same time p V q is true, p '  V r is true and p A p '  is a 
contradiction. Moreover, the quantity 1 - I-l(p, p ' ) ,  which estimates the 
certainty of this contradiction, takes into account he possibility that nonfuzzy 
representatives o fp  and p" are or are not mutually exclusive. The pattern (29) 
can be seen as a counterpart in our framework of the following valid reasoning in 
modal logic [using (15)] 
[] ~p V ~p'  
E3pV q 
[ ]p '  V r 
(30) 
Dqvr  
[where [] ( -~p v ~p ' )  is logically equivalent to -~ 0 (p A p')] .  Note that (29) 
can be formally obtained from the three uncertain clauses 
-~p v -~p' (N, l -H(p ,p ' ) )  
p v q (N, or) 
p '  v r (N,/3) 
by applying (7) twice and "forgetting" that we deal with fuzzy propositions, this 
fact being taken into account only by the estimate 1 - H(p, p ' )  in the first 
clause. Indeed this clause then plays a particular ole of pivot in this formal 
application of the resolution procedure [where the quantities H(p,  - ,p)  and 
I I (p ' ,  ~p ' )  that would appear using (29) are artificially frozen at the value 0 as 
if forgetting the fuzziness of p and p '  ]. 
Resolution Principle with Possibility-Qualified Fuzzy Propositions 
Similarly to the case of necessity-qualified fuzzy propositions we shall 
interpret the fuzzy assertion "x  satisfies P with possibility at least ct" in terms of 
a family of uncertain (possibility-qualified) propositions. It is natural to interpret 
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"x  possibly satisfies P"  [symbolically denoted by P(x) (I-I, 1)], as 
P(x) (Fl, 1) ¢~ VX E [0, 1), n(Px)= 1 (31) 
Indeed if/~ denotes the membership function of the fuzzy set underlying the 
fuzzy possibility-qualified statement (i.e., attached to the possibility measure), 
then FI(P) = 1 means that Ve > 0, 3u E Pl_, ,  /~(u) > 1 - e, so that vX, 
FI(P×) = 1 due to the monotonicity property of X-cuts. (31) naturally extends to 
the case of c~ - possibility-qualified fuzzy propositions into Definition 4. 
DEFINITION 4 The possibility-qualified fuzzy assertion P(x) (FI, cO is 
equivalent to the set of inequalities 
VX< c~, II(Px(x))>a (32) 
Indeed, it means that for all strong ),-cuts containing P~, x possibly satisfies P× 
with possibility at least c~. But the status of all statements that are more specific 
(X _> o0 remains totally uncertain. (32) is also in accordance with Zadeb's 
definition of the possibility of a fuzzy event [1], since, letting # denote the 
membership function underlying II, we prove the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 7 (32) is equivalent to II(P) >_ a. 
Proof We need the identity I-l(P) = sup× rain(X, II(P×)). (32) implies II(P) 
>_ max(supx_~ min(X, FI(P×)), sup×<~ min(X, a)) >_ a. Conversely, if II(Pe) 
= 3' for some fi < a, 3' < a, then, l-I(P×) _< % vX ___ B. So II(P) = 
max(supx<~ min(X, II(P×)), sup×_,~ min(X, I-I(P×))) _< max(/$, 3') < ~ • 
This interpretation e ables the fuzzy counterpart of the mixed pattern (9) to be 
derived. 
PROPOSITION 8 The following inference rule involving fuzzy propositions 
is valid: 
p v q (N, a) 
p '  v r (I-I,/3) 
q V r (H, min[~, 1 - l-I(p, p ' ) ]  [m/~) 
(33) 
Proof To verify the validity of this pattern we translate the two premises as 
follows; 
vX>_II(p, p ' ) ,  
vX, 
vX<~, 
-~px v -~p~ (N, 1) 
Px V qx (N, rain(u, 1 -  X)) 
P x v rx (I-i,/~) 
18 Didier Dubois and Henri Prade 
Provided that H(p, p') < /5, we can derive by the possibilistic logic 
resolution principles (7) and (9), 
¥)` E [rI(p, p ' ) ,  fl), II(qx v rx)_>min(c~, 1-)`) [m/5 
but i f ) , '  < II(p, p ' )  _< )`, H(qx,V rx,) >_ II(qx v rx). Hence 
¥)`</5, H(qx V rx)_>min(a, 1- r I (p ,  p ' ) )  Im/5 
Note that the right-hand side of this inequality is either/5 or 0. If it is 0, then 
nothing informative isdeduced, and this can be formally expressed as q v r (II 
,0). Otherwise from (32) we get q V r (H,/5). Hence pattern (33) is valid 
whenever H(p, p ' )  < /5, that is, when the fuzzy predicates P(x) and P'(x) 
are contradictory enough. 
Due to the definition of Ira, we need/5 > 1 - minion, 1 - H(p, p')]  = 
max[1 - ct, H(p, p')]  in order to get a nontrivial result from pattern (33). 
Hence, we do not need to check the condition/5 > H(p, p ' )  in order to apply 
pattern (33). It will give no informative results whenever this condition is not 
met. • 
Pattern (33) can be mimicked formally similarly to (29), applying (7) and (9) 
to the generalized clauses 
-~p v -~p' (N, 1 -n (p ,  p'))  
p vq  (N, o0 
p '  v r (I-I,/5) 
Note that a lower bound of H(q V r) can be obtained in two different ways, 
which are equivalent, since due to (14) we have 
. min[ct, 1 -H(p ,  p')]  ]m/5=a Im [ (1-H(p,  p'))]m/5] 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is interesting to note the difference in purpose between the approach 
developed here and the work of Lee [14] and his followers. Lee [14] is 
concerned with fuzzy propositions to which precise grades of truth are assigned. 
Hence this paper is about resolution in the special multiple-valued logic 
underlying elementary fuzzy set theory. The same remarks apply to Orlowska 
and Wierzchon's paper [19], except hat they use an intuitionistic negation and 
G/kiel's implication. In our approach we only attach degrees of uncertainty to 
fuzzy propositions, without knowing their degrees of truth. It is possible to 
locate both approaches with respect o one another if we interpret both truth 
values and uncertainty measures as deriving from fuzzy truth values as defined 
by Zadeh [15]. A fuzzy truth value is local in the sense that it always means the 
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truth value of a fuzzy proposition p given that another fuzzy proposition q is 
valid, q represents our knowledge about he state of the world (i.e., the available 
information) while p refers to some question that we formulate, and we try to 
know about p given q (see Dubois and Prade [3] for a more detailed statement of
this view). In that conceptual framework, precise truth values presuppose 
complete knowledge about the state of the world. In contrast, incomplete 
knowledge implies imprecise truth values, leading to uncertainty on the state of 
truth, this uncertainty being estimated by means of degrees of possibility and 
necessity. This paper is thus built under the assumption of incomplete 
knowledge. 
We have discussed several extensions of the resolution principle in order to 
accommodate the uncertainty of clauses and the vagueness of predicates in the 
framework of possibility and necessity measures. These extensions remain in the 
style of a syntactic treatment of the clauses, since we are not using an explicit 
representation in terms of membership functions [except for the computation of
rI(p, p ' ) ,  but that could be performed off-line] as in other approaches to 
approximate r asoning based on possibility theory. The proposed results offer a 
rigorous basis for implementing refutation strategies for theorem proving under 
uncertainty or for integrating a non ad hoc treatment of uncertainty and 
vagueness in PROLOG-Iike languages. Besides, the similarity between the 
patterns of reasoning we have presented and existing rules of inference in modal 
logic raises intriguing questions on the relation between modal logic and 
possibilistic logic (see, e.g., Dubois et al. [13]). 
Besides, an interesting issue is to develop fuzzy set semantics for possibility- 
or necessity-valued propositions. This can be done in the case of statements of
the form N(p)  >_ ~ using (23) and the principle of minimum specificity. In that 
case the completeness and soundness of the extended resolution principle can be 
established (Dubois et al. [20]). Such semantics are less easy to define for 
statements of the form rI(p) _> or, because the principle of minimum specificity 
does not apply here [indeed, the least specific membership function # such that 
supuEA #(U) --> o~ allocates membership 1 to any u in the domain containing the 
set A of models of P]. Moreover, an inference rule stronger than (9) is required 
to get any completeness, as pointed out in Section 3. Lastly, this work points out 
that the usual definition of necessity can be challenged in the presence of fuzzy 
predicates (see the second part of Section 4). Indeed it may become 
counterintuitive when modeling statements like "It is rather certain that John is 
tall." This state of facts might be useful to remember for further studies in fuzzy 
logic. 
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